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ABSTRACT
As an issue offirst impression in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction,
a United States district court in Texas considered whether it is
impossible to state a claim for speech retaliation which involves the loss
of a plaintiff's volunteer ministry rights and credentials. The court, in
line with decisions from other federal courts and analogous Supreme
Court cases, determined that being a volunteer is the type of
governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which triggers First
Amendment scrutiny, and it held that the volunteer chaplain stated a
valid claim for retaliation. This article summarizes the law concerning
retaliation against volunteers based on the exercise of their First
Amendment rights, as well as analogous Supreme Court law. The article
concludes that other federal courts that decide the issue, including the
United States Supreme Court, will likely, and should, continue the
pattern and decide that volunteers are protected from retaliation based
on their exercise ofFirst Amendment rights.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................... ..... 100
I. HANSON v. CAMERON COUNTY............................... 102
II. THE GREAT WEIGHT OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES SUGGESTS THAT A
VOLUNTEER IS PROTECTED FROM RETALIATION BASED ON
PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT.............. 105
III. THE DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS ARE CONSISTENT
WITH ANALOGOUS SUPREME COURT CASES...... ........... 116
IV. THUS FAR, COURTS HAVE DISAGREED WITH OPPONENTS OF A
VOLUNTEER RETALIATION CLAIM WHO ARGUE, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, THAT BEING A VOLUNTEER Is NOT A PROTECTABLE
INTEREST OR VALUABLE BENEFIT ......................... 117
CONCLUSION .......................................... ....... 123
INTRODUCTION
Brownsville, Texas, does not conjure up the image of a First
Amendment bastion, but a recent decision in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas might change some people's
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minds. On January 14, 2010, Judge Hilda G. Tagle ruled that the First
Amendment prohibits government actors from retaliating against
volunteers on the basis of protected free speech.' The decision came in a
motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in Hanson v. Cameron
County,2 which involved a lawsuit brought by a former chaplain at the
Cameron County Jail who alleged she was wrongfully discharged from
her volunteer position in retaliation for exercising her right to free
speech.
The decision in Brownsville is the latest marker in a continuing
pattern of federal courts holding that a volunteer is shielded from
retaliation based on protected speech under the First Amendment.4
1. See Hanson v. Cameron Cnty., No. B-09-202, 2010 WL 148723, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 14, 2010).
2. Id. at*1, *6.
3. The parties settled the case before trial. Compromise Settlement Agreement
& General Release, Hanson, 2010 WL 148723 (No. B-09-202). Under the settlement
agreement, Ms. Hanson, the volunteer chaplain, must give notice to the County and
give it a reasonable time to correct the situation before she speaks out in a public
forum or to the media about any jail conditions of concern to her. Id. at 3-4. The
chaplain acknowledged in the agreement that this temporarily limits her state and
federal free speech rights only during the reasonable time period provided by the
County and Sheriffs Department. Id. at 4. Ms. Hanson also agreed to immediately
report to a law enforcement agency any conduct-regardless of its source-that she
believes is a criminal offense. Id. at 3. The settlement agreement also stipulates that
entry into the jails is a revocable privilege. Id. at 2. In exchange, the Defendants
agreed not to revoke or restrict the privilege if Ms. Hanson makes her concerns
public-so long as she complies with the stipulation that she notify the Defendants
first and gives them time to resolve the complaints. Id. at 4-5.
The settlement agreement also allows Ms. Hanson to resume her ministry at
the jail, creates a policy for the jail to follow to deal fairly with chaplains, and
requires a payment of $25,000 by the County to the attorneys working for Ms.
Hanson. Id. at 2-5. Additionally, the agreement provides that the Defendants will
instruct detention officers and jail administrative staff that Ms. Hanson is to be
treated with the same courtesy and respect due all volunteer chaplains. Id at 5.
4. See, e.g., Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 534-35 (7th Cir.
2006) (holding that a volunteer stated a claim for retaliation based on protected
speech); Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that a
person or organization's exercise of protected free speech rights cannot be the basis
of preventing that person or organization from volunteering); Hyland v. Wonder,
972 F.2d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that even though a volunteer had no
right in the first instance to serve as a volunteer, and even though such a volunteer
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Although this issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, lower
courts that have analyzed whether a volunteer is protected from
retaliation based on First Amendment speech have unanimously held or
indicated that the answer is "yes."5
The prior decisions relating to a volunteer's protection from
retaliation based on protected speech under the First Amendment
indicate the recent decision in the Southern District of Texas is not
merely a trend, but is and will be, the rule in federal courts that address
this issue. 6
This article contains four parts. Part I examines the decision in
Hanson v. Cameron County. Part II surveys federal authorities that have
addressed the issue of whether a volunteer is protected from retaliation
based on protected speech under the First Amendment. Part III compares
those authorities to Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases. Part IV
weighs the widely used arguments by both sides in these cases, and it
includes discussion on the key issue of whether a volunteer position is a
valuable government benefit.
I. HANSON v. CAMERON COUNTY
On September 1, 2009, Plaintiff Gail Hanson filed suit against
Defendants Cameron County and Omar Lucio, who serves as Sheriff of
Cameron County. Ms. Hanson alleged that Defendants "retaliated
against her after she publicly criticized Defendants' operation of the
Cameron County Jail ("jail")."8 Ms. Hanson alleged that, since 2000, she
had "served as an official volunteer chaplain at the jail."9
As part of the application process for Ms. Hanson to become a
volunteer chaplain, she submitted to a background check performed by
Cameron County, completed an application, and submitted "a letter of
could be terminated at will, the government could not terminate such a volunteer in
retaliation for that volunteer's exercise of his First Amendment rights).
5. See, e.g., Mosely, 434 F.3d 527; Cuffley, 208 F.3d 702; Hyland, 972 F.2d
1129.
6. See, Mosely, 434 F.3d 527; Cuffley, 208 F.3d 702; Hyland, 972 F.2d 1129.
7. Hanson, 2010 WL 148723, at *1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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support from the pastor at her church.",o After these tasks were
completed, "Cameron County issued her an official volunteer chaplain's
badge."' As a result, Ms. Hanson was allowed to "visit inmates without
being placed on an individual prisoner's approved visitors list."l2 She
was also allowed "contact" visits, while other visitors could only speak
to inmates from behind a glass barrier. Ms. Hanson was also "permitted
to speak with several prisoners at a time and without the prior
authorization of Defendants' staff.,,14
"In early 2009, [Ms.] Hanson spoke at a public political
candidate forum regarding the conditions that she observed at the jail,
which she alleged included women suffering miscarriages as the result of
poor health services."' 5 Ms. Hanson alleged that, shortly after the
political forum, Defendant Lucio ordered that Ms. Hanson was banned
from the jail. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent "Defendants
from banning her from the jail and declaratory relief allowing her to
continue her volunteer ministry."' 7
Ms. Hanson's lawsuit centered on her claims that the Defendants
stripped her of her position as a jail minister and banned her from the jail
after she publically criticized Defendants' operation of the jail.'"
Defendants argued that, as a volunteer, Ms. Hanson had no right to be at
the jail and no protectable interest in her service as a volunteer.
Was the sheriff legally entitled to ban Ms. Hanson, a volunteer,
for her speech at a political rally? The clear answer from Judge Tagle
was "no." 20
At the motion to dismiss stage, the court found that Ms.
Hanson's service as a prison minister-even though it was done in a
volunteer capacity-is the type of "governmental benefit or privilege the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *4.
19. See id. at *1, *4-5.
20. Id. at *6 (holding that the plaintiff had presented an actionable claim).
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deprivation of which triggers First Amendment scrutiny." 2 1 Therefore,
the court concluded that Ms. Hanson "stated an actionable claim for
speech retaliation for revoking her volunteer minister credentials in
retaliation for her public speech."22
Ms. Hanson prevailed at the motion to dismiss stage because her
complaint was grounded in First Amendment jurisprudence that prohibits
government actors from retaliating against volunteers on the basis of
speech.23 Indeed, Judge Tagle's decision helps solidify a pattern in the
federal courts recognizing that volunteers are protected from retaliation
based on First Amendment speech.24
In Ms. Hanson's case, Defendants attempted to characterize her
complaint as claiming a "right to minister at the [Cameron County]
jail." 25 But Ms. Hanson asserted no such "right," and her claims were not
based on this purported "right."26 Ms. Hanson's case was about the
government's duty not to punish protected speech, not her "right" to a
governmental benefit.27 As one federal court maintained:
For at least a quarter-century, th[e Supreme] Court
has made clear that even though a person has no
"right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely.
21. See id. at *2.
22. Id. at *6.
23. See generally id. (citation omitted) ("[T]he Court's conclusion squares
with the decisions of other courts who have considered speech retaliation issues in a
volunteer and non-employment contexts.").
24. Id. at *2. See discussion infra Part II.
25. Hanson, 2010 WL 148723, at *1.
26. See id. at *2.
27. See also Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that
the district court found sufficient evidence that the defendant police officials
deprived the plaintiffs, instructors at a police academy, of the benefit of continued
enrollment in their courses and at least some of the defendants sought to have the
instructors removed from the academy altogether after the plaintiffs testified as
experts against the police in an excessive force case). See generally Hanson, 2010
WL 148723 at *2 ("[Plaintiff] alleges a claim that Defendants retaliated against her
by taking away her ability to be a volunteer at the jail, a governmental benefit or
privilege the deprivation of which triggers First Amendment scrutiny.").
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It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests
28
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
In Perry v. Sindermann,29 for example, a non-tenured teacher
alleged that the non-renewal of his one-year contract based on protected
speech triggered First Amendment scrutiny.30 The Supreme Court
agreed.3' The Court reasoned that, even though a plaintiff has no right to
a valuable government benefit, that benefit cannot be taken away based
on protected speech by the Plaintiff.32 "Thus, the [non-tenured teacher's]
lack of a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment" was "immaterial
to his free speech claim."33
II. THE GREAT WEIGHT OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES SUGGESTS
THAT A VOLUNTEER IS PROTECTED FROM RETALIATION
BASED ON PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether a volunteer is protected from retaliation based on
protected free speech under the First Amendment. 34 As discussed below,
all federal appellate courts that have decided this issue, however, have
held that a volunteer is afforded protection from retaliation under the
First Amendment.3
28. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 357 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972)).
29. 408 U.S. 593.
30. Id. at 595.
31. See id. at 597-98.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that
"as of April 2006, the law was not sufficiently clear to put ... [the defendant] on
notice that declining to reappoint . . . [the plaintiff] to the volunteer position of Parks
Commissioner in retaliation for his First Amendment activities was unlawful"
because the issue of "whether a volunteer position is a valuable government benefit
the loss of which can form the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim had not
been decided").
35. See infra Part II.
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Seventh Circuit
36In Mosely v. Board of Education of Chicago, a mother claimed
the school board violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating
against her for advocating in favor of her child's educational rights-the
claim was rooted in the school board's dismissal of her as the
chairperson of a school committee.3 7 The district court dismissed
Mosley's retaliation claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to
state a claim.38 The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that:
[i]n the analogous context of public employees
who allege that their employers retaliated against
them based on assertions of First Amendment
rights, we have observed that a "§ 1983 case does
not require an adverse employment action within
the meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes, such
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."39
The court found that Mosely effectively could not serve as
chairperson of the school's Improving America's Schools Act ("IASA")
committee due to retaliation.40 In addition, the court cited a "direct
allegation of action . . . designed to chill [Mosely's] free speech."41
36. 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006).
37. See id. at 529-30, 534.
38. Id. at 529. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, First Amendment retaliation
claims (i.e., Constitutional claims) can be brought under section 1983. See Hyland v.
Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998)
(stating that the elements needed to be alleged for a First Amendment retaliation
claim by volunteers, or individuals that are not technically employees, include the
following: "(1) the loss of a valuable government benefit (2) in retaliation for their
speech (3) on a matter of public concern").
39. Id. at 533 (quoting Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004)).
40. Id. at 534.
4 1. Id.
Namely, a teacher called the police to have Mosely removed from school
42
while passing out flyers regarding an IASA meeting.
The Seventh Circuit stated, "The fact that Mosely was a
volunteer as opposed to a paid city employee is of little consequence to
our analysis." 43 This position was based in the reality that Mosely did not
bring a procedural due process claim, which would have required her to
have a protected property interest in her position as IASA chairperson.
The First Amendment claim required only a determination that the
school "unconstitutionally retaliated against" her for engaging in
45protected speech. While Mosely did not have a "right" to the valuable
government benefit of her volunteer position, her service as chairperson
of the IASA committee precluded the government from denying that
valuable benefit on a basis that violated constitutionally protected
46interests, especially freedom of speech.
Eighth Circuit
In a case with facts very different from Mosely, the Eighth
Circuit reaffirmed the right of volunteers not to be retaliated against for
exercising their protected free speech rights.47 In Cuffley v. Mickes, the
Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission denied the
application of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) to participate in the Adopt-A-
Highway (AAH) program. 49 The state denied the KKK's application, in
part, because Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevented the state
from conferring a benefit on the KKK because of their discriminatory
practices based on race, creed, color, and national origin.so The court
held, "So long as the State does not deny anyone an opportunity to adopt
a highway on an improper basis, the State does not violate Title VI. The
42. Id.
4 3. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing McGill v. Bd. of Educ. of Pekin Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 108,
602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1979)).
46. Id at 534-35 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
47. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2000).
48. 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 704.
50. Id. at 705.
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Klan, as one of many voluntary participants in the program, is free to
determine its own membership."5 1
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the state denied the KKK's
application based on the organization's beliefs and advocacy because it
could provide no "convincing and constitutional reason for the denial." 52
As such, Cuffley provides two important insights in this line of cases.
First, the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission assumed
that allowing volunteers to participate conferred a government benefit,
53
and the court did not challenge that categorization. Second, a person or
organization's exercise of protected free speech rights cannot be the basis
of preventing that person or organization from volunteering.54 This is
distinguishable from but analogous to Mosely, above, and Hyland,
below, which prevent termination of someone in a volunteer position
from exercising protected free speech rights.
Ninth Circuit
Hyland v. Wonder56 involved a volunteer with the San Francisco
Juvenile Probation Department who wrote a memorandum to the judges
supervising Juvenile Hall regarding problems there and failings of the
Department's director.5 7 His allegations against the director, Stephen La
Plante, included a charge of incompetent administration, citing low staff
morale, a decline in accountability, and lack of leadership in the
department.58 Immediately upon discovering that Hyland had written this
memorandum, the chief probation officer of the Department told Hyland
to leave and that he would never "be allowed into Juvenile Hall again."59
51. Id. at 711.
52. Id. at 707.
53. See id In fact, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
had already recognized that volunteer positions constituted a valuable government
benefit. Id. at 707-08 n.5 (citing Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir.
1996); Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129,1135 (9th Cir. 1992)).
54. See Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 709.
55. See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2006);
Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1136.
56. 972 F.2d 1129.
57. Id. at 1133.
58. Id.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Hyland also alleged that other retaliatory incidents designed to prevent
60him from working in juvenile justice occurred or were threatened.
Hyland filed suit, alleging that his termination came in violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it was retaliation for his
protected speech. The district codfrt dismissed Hyland's federal action
for failure to state a claim.62 The Ninth Circuit reversed and resoundingly
affirmed that the opportunity to serve as a volunteer with the City
Juvenile Probation Department was the type of governmental benefit or
privilege that could not be denied on the basis of constitutionally
63protected speech. The court held that even though a volunteer had no
right in the first instance to serve as a volunteer, and even though such a
volunteer could be terminated at will, the government could not
terminate such a volunteer in retaliation for that volunteer's exercise of
his First Amendment rights. 4 Even if the loss of a volunteer position
perhaps is not as momentous as a salaried employee being terminated,
the Ninth Circuit argued that "[r]etaliatory actions . . . are equally
egregious in the eyes of the Constitution because a person is being
punished for engaging in protected speech."65
The Ninth Circuit was detailed in its explication of why
volunteering is a government benefit: "a person gains valuable
experience and education in public administration and can make
professional contacts . . . . The opportunity to serve as a volunteer is also
important because it provides an individual the satisfaction of making a
contribution, or giving something back, to society."6 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit supported the position that the Seventh Circuit would later
assert-simply because Hyland had no right to be a volunteer and served
in that position at-will does not diminish his First Amendment retaliation
claim.67
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1133-34.
63. Id. at 1135, 1143.
64. Id at 1136.
65. Id at 1135.
66. Id. at 1135-36.
67. Id. at 1136.
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Tenth Circuit
6~8The Tenth Circuit, in Andersen v. McCotter, reaffirmed the
notion that just because an individual serves as a volunteer does not
mean his or her rights to First Amedtdment protection are diminished.69
In Andersen, a college student obtained an internship with the Utah
Board of Pardons.70 She was assigned to work "assisting in a therapy
program for sex-offenders." 7 When the Utah Department of Corrections
("DOC") proposed changing its sex-offender treatment programs,
Andersen gave a television interview criticizing the changes and warning
they could result in sex offenders possibly being released too early.7 2 The
next day, the DOC fired Andersen from her internship, stating she had
violated policy by saying "something negative about the Department."73
Andersen filed suit under § 1983, basing her claim on the
position that her speech was "on a matter of public concern and was,
therefore, protected by the First Amendment."7 4 The district court
dismissed the case, stating that Andersen's constitutional rights had not
been violated.75 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit declared Andersen was a
government employee, based upon the facts that she was paid for twenty
hours of work per week and received college credit for additional hours
76
she worked. The payment and credit both constituted valuable
government benefits in the eyes of the court.7 7 As a result, despite being
an at-will employee, Andersen's First Amendment claim could not be
diminished.
The Tenth Circuit analysis, however, went even further. In
applying the Pickering balancing test,79 the court noted that "even if we
68. 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 727.
70. Id. at 725.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 726.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 726-27.
79. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968). The Pickering balancing test, discussed infra Parts II and III, involves a
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accepted Defendants' arguments and considered Ms. Andersen a nonpaid
volunteer, her claim would not be defeated. Defendants argue that
volunteers are not entitled to First Amendment protection under
Pickering. We disagree."80 The Tenth Circuit noted that exercising free
speech rights is not dependent upon earning a salary and that the
Supreme Court has cited a variety of benefits outside the traditional
scope of the employer-employee relationship that "cannot be denied
solely because of the exercise of constitutional rights." 1 Once the court
determined Andersen had a protectable interest, it applied the Pickering
balancing test and declared that the district court erred in dismissing the
82
case.
Other federal appellate courts that have not actually decided the
issue have affirmatively suggested that they would afford a volunteer
protection from retaliation under the First Amendment, as detailed
below. 83
First Circuit
84
In Lynch v. City of Boston, Heather Lynch sued the City and
various city employees after she was both prohibited from working as a
seasonal employee during Boston's "Can Share" food drive and removed
from her volunteer position on the Mayor's Hunger Commission;
positions she had held from 1986 and 1987 until 1993 and 1994." In
December 1993, Lynch received a flyer that had been distributed to all
Boston employees by Thomas Menino, Boston's newly elected mayor,
which "encouraged employees to provide suggestions to his office for the
improvement of City services." In response to the flyer, on January 12,
balancing between the interests of the employee, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
80. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 727.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 728-29.
83. See, e.g., Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1364 (3d Cir. 1993); Janusaitis v.
Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979).
84. 180 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 6.
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1994, Lynch made what she intended to be an anonymous call to the
Mayor's office, complaining about the lack of staffing at the Boston's
Emergency Shelter Commission (ESC), which conducted the Can Share
87
effort. Coincidentally, Lynch spoke to John Greely at the Mayor's
office, who was the husband of Kelley Cronin, Lynch's supervisor at the
88Can Share program and the Executive Director of the ESC. Upon
hearing about the call, Cronin told Lynch to "clear out your desk."89
Cronin later told Lynch she would not be working on the 1994 Can Share
drive, and informed her that she had been removed from her volunteer
position on the Mayor's Hunger Commission.9 0 Lynch claimed that
Cronin's actions against her violated the First Amendment, § 1983, and
Massachusetts law.91 After the jury rendered a verdict, the District Court
for the District of Massachusetts entered a judgment holding that Cronin
was qualifiedly immune from the First Amendment claim, that the city
was not liable, and that Lynch was entitled to $4,000 in damages for
emotional distress.9 2
Although the court held that Cronin was entitled to qualified
immunity because her actions against Lynch did not violate "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known," 93 the court suggested that it otherwise would have
afforded Lynch protection from retaliation under the First Amendment. 94
The court stated, using the Hyland language without citing the case itself,
"We assume, without deciding, that the opportunity to serve as a
volunteer could constitute the type of valuable governmental benefit or
privilege the deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment
scrutiny." 95
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 7-9.
93. Id. at 13 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
94. See id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
95. Id.; accord Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Robert Janusaitis, a volunteer fireman, submitted a report
96
criticizing the management of the Fire Department. In the report, he
stated that training and morale at the Department were inadequate and
that Department accounting practices were unacceptable.9 7 After
receiving no response, he drafted a letter to the IRS stating that the
Department was "violating the Internal Revenue Code and generally
accepted accounting principles." 98 He sent a draft to the Department's
Executive Committee, threatening to also send it to the IRS if the
Department did not change their accounting practices. 99 The Executive
Committee and Department Chief suspended Janusaitis for thirty days.100
After returning to active duty, Janusaitis wrote another letter to the
Executive Committee stating that the suspension was politically
motivated and demanding an apology.' Janusaitis later delivered a letter
to the First Selectman of the Town, threatening to publicize an attached
document that discussed how the Fire Department was trying to "cover
up" the situation and explaining that he was planning to sue.10 Finally,
seven months after Janusaitis wrote his initial report, he participated in
conversations with a reporter, who published a story titled, "Fireman
Tells Story After Reinstatement."' 03 After the article was published, the
Department Chief and officers fired Janusaitis, and his dismissal was
upheld by the Executive Committee.104 Janusaitis sued under §§ 1983,
1985 and 1988 and for violations of his First Amendment rights.0 5 The
district court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Department's
expulsion did not constitute state action, and that even assuming state
action, the dismissal did not violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights. 10 6
96. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 18 (2d. Cir.
1979).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 19.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 20.
105. Id at 18.
106. Id. at 21.
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Contrary to the district court, which held that Janusaitis's
interview with the reporter was the only exercise of free speech,10 7 the
Second Circuit found that Janusaitis's letter to the IRS, the threatened
lawsuit, the communication to the First Selectman, and the newspaper
interview all came within the protection of the First Amendment. os The
court never addressed Janusaitis's status as a "volunteer fireman," simply
assuming that it was appropriate to apply the Pickering balancing test
because the case involved "the various exercises of speech by
appellant."'1 09 The court ultimately held that the successful functioning of
the Fire Department outweighed Janusaitis's interests, especially because
Janusaitis's actions were "more concerned with proving himself right
and every one else wrong than with truly promoting the welfare and
efficiency of the Department."' 10
Third Circuit
Paul Versarge was dismissed after working for a decade as a
volunteer firefighter. 111 In his capacity as a private citizen, he requested
that the Township of Clinton close a neighborhood street to traffic.11
Versarge's boss, the fire chief, publicly opposed the closure because it
would make it more difficult for emergency vehicles to respond to
emergencies in the neighborhood.113 Disagreement between Versarge and
the fire chief escalated, culminating in Versarge writing a letter to the
Mayor of Clinton stating that construction work had been done "at the
firehouse without first obtaining the proper building or electrical
11415permits., Versarge wrote an additional letter to the Mayor." Versarge
was then fired.116 After unsuccessfully trying to appeal his expulsion,
107. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 464 F.Supp. 288, 296 (D.
Conn. 1979).
108. Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 25.
109. See id
110. Id at 26-27 (quoting Janusaitis, 464 F.Supp. at 296).
111. See Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1361 (3d Cir.
1993).
112. See id
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1362.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Versarge filed suit, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and seeking relief under § 1983.' The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, and Versarge
appealed. 118
At the outset of its First Amendment analysis of the retaliatory
expulsion claim,"' the Third Circuit quoted Perry, stating that the
government "'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest in
freedom of speech."'120 It went on to state:
At this juncture, we need not, and do not, conclude
that plaintiff was an "employee" of the Hose
Company or the Township. Rather, we assume,
without deciding, that "the opportunity to serve as
a volunteer constitutes the type of governmental
benefit or privilege the deprivation of which can
trigger First Amendment scrutiny." 2 1
Despite this position, the court applied the Pickering balancing
test and cited to Janusaitis,122 ultimately holding that the First
Amendment did not protect the Plaintiffs speech because "the interests
of the Hose Company outweigh the limited interests of plaintiff and the
public in plaintiff s speech."l 2 3
Therefore, based upon the aforementioned survey of applicable
case law, it appears that no federal appellate court has held that a
volunteer, as a matter of law, should not be afforded protection from
retaliation under the First Amendment.
117. Id. at 1362-63.
118. Id. at 1361.
119. Id. at 1364.
120. Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
121. Id. (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1992)).
122. Id. at 1367.
123. Id. at 1368.
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III. THE DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS ARE
CONSISTENT WITH ANALOGOUS SUPREME COURT CASES
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, the fact that a plaintiff is a
volunteer as opposed to a paid city employee is of little consequence to
the First Amendment retaliation analysis.124 Although the Supreme Court
has not addressed the narrow issue of volunteers, in an analogous case,
the Supreme Court held that the government may not retaliate "against a
contractor, or a regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights"
under the First Amendment.125
In O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, a company
had been providing towing services to the City of Northlake.126 Such
providers of services had been removed from the list of providers only
for cause. 12 The owner of O'Hare Truck Services refused to contribute
to the Northlake mayor's reelection campaign and, instead, supported his
opponent.128 Northlake then removed O'Hare from its list of service
providers.129 The company alleged that its removal was in retaliation for
not supporting the mayor's reelection and resulted in substantial lost
income.130 The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that
Seventh Circuit precedent that prevented government officials from
124. See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 2006).
125. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City ofNorthlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715, 720
(1996) (emphasis added); see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
672-73 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment protects independent contractors
from termination or prevention of automatic renewal of at-will government contracts
in retaliation for their exercise of freedom of speech); Rutan v. Republican Party,
497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that even though low-level public employees had no
legal entitlement to the promotions, transfers, and recalls, the government may not
rely on a basis that infringes their First Amendment interests to deny them these
valuable benefits); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (holding that the First
Amendment forbids government officials to discharge or threaten to discharge public
employees solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, unless
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position involved); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
126. O'Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 715.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 716.
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discharging employees for refusing to support a political party or its
candidates did not apply to independent contractors.131 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 1
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that First Amendment
protections for those outside the traditional employment context are
1 33trumped by the government's desire to advance a patronage system.
Drawing such a distinction between employees and independent
contractors, the Court said, would make constitutional rights
unacceptably dependent on the government's classification of someone
as an employee or independent contractor. 13 4 Despite a long history in
American law of treating employees and independent contractors
differently, the Court said it was inappropriate for a constitutional claim
to rise or fall based on a distinction that is "a creature of the common law
of agency and torts.",35 In addition, such a rule would invite abuse,
allowing the government to "avoid constitutional liability simply by
attaching different labels to particular jobs."l 3 6 Thus, the Court in
O'Hare unequivocally recognized that retaliation claims now extend
beyond traditional employer-employee relationships. Furthermore,
nothing in O'Hare implies that a regular provider of services must be
paid; it should be sufficient that the provider receives a valuable
government benefit as a result of rendering services. Under the reasoning
of O'Hare, volunteers should be protected from retaliation based on the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
IV. THUS FAR, COURTS HAVE DISAGREED WITH OPPONENTS
OF A VOLUNTEER RETALIATION CLAIM WHO ARGUE, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, THAT BEING A VOLUNTEER IS NOT A
PROTECTABLE INTEREST OR VALUABLE BENEFIT
Many courts have addressed-and dismissed-the arguments
used by opponents of volunteer retaliation claims. For example, in
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 720.
134. Id. at 721 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 721
(1996)).
135. See id. at 722
136. Id. (citing Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679).
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denying the KKK's Adopt-A-Highway application in Cuffley, the
government asserted various state and federal statutes and regulations as
the basis for justifying its actions. 137 The Eighth Circuit, however,
rejected those assertions as after-the-fact, pretextual justifications. 13 8
In Hyland, the state argued that because the information
disclosed by Hyland was stale, conveyed only in an internal
communication, and merely involved a personnel dispute there was no
First Amendment infringement.139 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.140 First,
limited circulation does not lessen the public concern analysis in a
Pickering analysis. 14 1 Second, "general public awareness of an issue does
not make all further investigation or in-depth discussion of the matter
redundant, superfluous, or devoid of public interest."1 4 2 Third, casting the
issue as a personnel dispute did not free the court to simply ignore the
public interest analysis.143
In Andersen, the state argued for a bright-line rule that an unpaid
volunteer was unworthy of protection from retaliation. 144 The Tenth
Circuit rejected that notion out of hand.145
The central issue facing the Third Circuit in Versarge was
whether the plaintiffs conduct was a disruption so significant that it
impaired the function and harmony of the entity, which, in that case, was
a fire department.146 The "mere existence of some disruption would not
end our inquiry," the Third Circuit said.147 "Disruption is simply a weight
on the scales which must be balanced against the interests of plaintiff and
the public in plaintiffs speech."14 8 The context of the disruption is
important, and in Versarge the court found that the plaintiffs statements
impaired harmony in the volunteer fire department to such a degree that
137. See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708-11 (8th Cir. 2000).
138. See id. at 711.
139. See Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992).
140. See id. at 1138-39.
141. See id. (quoting Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,
415-16(1979)).
142. Id. at 1138 (citing Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16).
143. See id.
144. See Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 1996).
145. Id.
146. See Versage v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993).
147. Id.
148. Id (citing O'Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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it detrimentally affected the close relationships required by the working
environment.149
In Lynch, the First Circuit recognized that volunteers might be
constitutionally protected from retaliation, but the government asserted a
qualified immunity defense. 50 The court agreed that Lynch's supervisor
was protected by qualified immunity in this instance but also noted that
this defense is not absolute. The court also found that the free speech
rights of volunteers were not "clearly established" at the time of the
supervisor's conduct.152 Of course, a colorable argument now exists that
volunteers in the First Circuit should be protected from retaliation
because the court has now "clearly established" this right.
In Janusaitis, the state asserted that the plaintiffs speech
impaired the performance of a government function. 153 While the Second
Circuit agreed that Janusaitis' conduct had done so in this case, it noted
that such an analysis must be conducted on a "case-by-case" basis. 5 4 The
court ruled that the speech had undermined the government's authority
and, more importantly, that the speech was primarily driven by
Janusaitis's personal motivation and not the public good. 55
The most common argument against a volunteer retaliation claim
based on protected speech, however, is simply that the volunteer's status
"does not qualify as a 'valuable government benefit,' the loss of which
would trigger a speech retaliation claim analysis." 56 No Supreme Court
precedent directly limits "valuable government benefits" to paid work or
vendor contracts. 57 The Supreme Court, however, has stated that
"[a]lthough the benefits withdrawn may be within the discretion of the
government to award, the Government may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
149. See id at 1367.
150. See Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1999).
15 1. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d
Cir. 1979).
154. See id
155. See id at 26.
156. See Hanson v. Cameron Cnty, No. B-09-22, 2010 WL 148723, at *4-6
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2010).
157. Id at *5.
2011] 119
120 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
especially, his interest in freedom of speech."158 The Supreme Court has
also recognized that protections have been extended beyond the
government employee retaliation context to the termination of at-will
employment contracts as well as the non-renewal of government vendor
contracts.159 Thus, courts addressing the issue of whether the loss of
volunteer status is a valuable government benefit, the loss of which
would trigger a speech retaliation claim, have found that it is such a
benefit.'60
158. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
159. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 670-71; Hanson,
2010 WL 148723, at *6.
160. See, e.g., Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d at 1135-36; Hanson, 2010 WL
148723, at *6.
But cf Barton v. Edward Clancy, Jr., 632 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (involving a
Parks Commissioner who claimed retaliation based on his First Amendment
activity). In Barton, the First Circuit argued that "the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have found that volunteer positions are entitled to constitutional protection
... [but those] cases relied in part, either directly or indirectly, on state statutes
which mandate that such volunteers be treated as employees." Id. at 25. Specifically,
the court in Barton claimed that the Ninth Circuit in Hyland relied on the Second
Circuit case, Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1979), the latter of which involved a Connecticut law that "specifically provided that
volunteer firemen 'shall be construed to be employees of the municipality' for
purposes of workmen's compensation." Id. at 24 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-
314a (2011)). As an initial matter, the court in Hyland did not rely on any California
statute, or mention any state statute, in its analysis to determine that a juvenile
probation department volunteer is protected from retaliation based on protected
speech. See Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1134-36. In fact, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"whether Hyland is labelled [sic] a public employee or a volunteer is not
determinative of whether Hyland stated a claim of First Amendment" retaliation-the
critical question was "whether Hyland alleged the loss of a valuable government
benefit or privilege in retaliation for his speech," which he had, based on the loss of
his volunteer position. Id. at 1136, 1140-41 (referencing a California statute only
with regard to the due process claim of Hyland, not his First Amendment retaliation
claim, to conclude that Hyland had no property interest in the volunteer position and
therefore could not maintain a due process claim, while he could maintain a First
Amendment retaliation claim). Thus, the Barton Court's argument that the Ninth
Circuit in Hyland "found that volunteer positions are entitled to constitutional
protection . . . [by relying] on state statutes which mandate such volunteers be
treated as employees" is belied by the Hyland decision itself, as the Ninth Circuit (I)
did not rely on any California statute, or mention any state statute, in its analysis to
determine whether the volunteer was protected from retaliation based on protected
speech; (2) stated that it was irrelevant whether an individual was a public employee
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or volunteer for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (3) held that
the loss of a volunteer position constituted the loss of a valuable government benefit
or privilege that is afforded protection in a First Amendment retaliation claim. See
Barton, 632 F.3d at 25; Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1134-36, 1140-41.
Similarly, the Barton Court claimed that the Seventh Circuit in Mosely v. Bd.
of Educ., 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006), relied upon another Seventh Circuit case,
Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of Edgerton Volunteer Fire Dep't, 97 F.3d 969 (7th
Cir. 1996), the latter of which concluded that a volunteer firefighter could be
protected by the First Amendment based in part on a Wisconsin state statute that
treated volunteer firefighters as employees under the law for workmen's
compensation. See Barton, 632 F.3d at 25; Brown, 434 F.3d at 973. The Mosely
Court, however, did not rely on any Illinois statute, or mention any state statute, in
its analysis to determine that a mother serving as a chairperson on a school
committee (which the court described as a nominal position at best) is protected
from retaliation based on protected speech. See Mosely, 434 F.3d at 530, 533-35. In
fact, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Hyland, the Seventh Circuit
stated that "[t]he fact that Mosely was a volunteer as opposed to a paid city
employee is of little consequence to our analysis"-under a First Amendment
retaliation claim, the issue is whether the defendants unconstitutionally retaliated
against Mosely based on her protected speech. Id. at 534 (distinguishing a procedural
due process claim, which requires a protected property interest, from a First
Amendment retaliation claim, which does not require a protected property interest).
As for the Second Circuit case, Janusaitis, 607 F.2d 17, the Barton Court
argued that it too relied on "state statute[s] that treated volunteer[s] ... as employees
under the law." Barton, 632 F.3d at 25 (citing Janusaitis). Specifically, the Barton
Court claimed that the Janusaitis Court, "after concluding that the termination of the
firefighter was 'state action' for purposes of a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim, . . . simply
treated the firefighter as a public employee for purposes of the First Amendment
claim." Id, at 24 (emphasis added) (citing Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 25). In fact, the
Janusaitis Court did not state that it relied on the Connecticut statute treating
firefighters as employees under the workmen's compensation statute to show that the
plaintiff was entitled to protection as a volunteer, but instead used it to show that the
actions of the defendant, Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, constituted state
action as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 21-22, 25. As set
forth above in this article, the court never addressed Janusaitis's status as a
"volunteer fireman" and simply assumed that it was appropriate to apply the
Pickering balancing test because the case involved "the various exercises of speech
by appellant." Id. at 25.
The Barton Court also attempted to rely on Hoyt v. Andreucci , 433 F.3d 320
(2d Cir. 2006), to argue that "Janusaitis does not appear to reflect the prevailing
view of the Second Circuit." Barton, 632 F.3d at 24, n.13; see Hoyt, 433 F.3d 320.
In Hoyt, the Second Circuit stated that it "had not yet addressed whether 'claims of
termination from volunteer positions based on protected conduct are equivalent to, or
should be analyzed different from, more traditional claims of termination from
salaried government positions."' Hoyt, 433 F.3d at 327 n.5 (quoting Gorman-Bakos
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In short, while the Pickering analysis binds a court's ultimate
decision, it is increasingly clear that volunteer status is a valuable
governmental benefit, no less than potential business contracts or tax
exemptions.161 Official volunteer positions are often difficult to obtain,
and volunteer positions can often open the door for many other
opportunities for the individual volunteer.162 The opportunity to serve as
a volunteer is also an important governmental benefit "because it
provides an individual the satisfaction of making a contribution to
v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 552 n.2 (2d Cir.
2001)). This argument also appears misplaced. Hoyt involved an employee who was
granted a leave of absence from his corrections officer job to fulfill his union
leadership responsibilities. Hoyt, 433 F.3d at 322. Plaintiff Hoyt tried to analogize
his situation during his leave to that of a volunteer, but his leave agreement made
clear that "Hoyt would remain a public employee throughout his leave period." Id. at
327 n.5, 328. As a result, the court did not perform an analysis of plaintiff s status as
a volunteer because the court found he was not a volunteer. Id. at 328.
The Gorman case, quoted by Hoyt for the proposition relied on by Barton,
involved plaintiffs who filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other
things, violation of their First Amendment free speech rights. Gorman, 252 F.3d at
551. In Gorman, plaintiffs alleged that the Cooperative, a subordinate government
agency that ran programs such as the 4-H program, "retaliated against them by,
among other things, terminating their volunteer status and enrollment in 4-H because
... plaintiffs advocated policies contrary to those of defendants." Id. In a footnote,
the Court stated that the trial court "presumed that plaintiffs had suffered an adverse
employment action." Id. at 552 n.2. The court continued, "We do not address the
question of whether plaintiffs' claims of termination from volunteer positions based
on protected conduct are equivalent to, or should be analyzed differently from, more
traditional claims of termination from salaried government positions." Id. (citing
Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1135) (holding that serving as a volunteer constituted a
government benefit or privilege and that "retaliatory actions with less momentous
consequences [than loss of employment], such as loss of a volunteer position, are
equally egregious in the eyes of the Constitution because a person is being punished
for engaging in protected speech"). The Gorman Court remanded the case to the trial
court for determinations relating to the Pickering balancing test and vacated the trial
court's granting of defendants' summary judgment motion. Id. at 557-58. The court
made no reference to a statute allowing the 4-H volunteers to be treated as
employees, and the court allowed the volunteers' First Amendment Retaliation claim
to proceed. Id. Thus, it appears that the Second Circuit allows volunteers to pursue
First Amendment retaliation claims. Id.
Importantly, the Barton Court maintained that "no court has held that
volunteers are not protected by the First Amendment." Barton, 632 F.3d at 25-26.
161. See Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1135-36.
162. Id.
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society."l63 In addition, volunteers should be protected from retaliation
because they often provide the public with a unique and independent
view of government.164
CONCLUSION
Federal courts that have encountered the issue of whether a
volunteer is shielded from retaliation based on protected speech under
the First Amendment have consistently determined that the reach of a
First Amendment retaliation claim extends to volunteers. In Gail
Hanson's case, the federal court in Brownsville came to the same
conclusion. The key inquiry is whether volunteer status is the type of
governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which triggers First
Amendment scrutiny. Despite arguments to the contrary, federal courts
have answered the latter question in the affirmative. It is anticipated that
other federal courts that decide the issue, including the United States
Supreme Court, will likely, and should, continue the pattern and decide
163. Id.
164. Potential volunteer plaintiffs should be aware that government defendants
may often have an interest in regulating the speech of its employees. See Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In Pickering, the
Supreme Court held that government employees may not be compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public institutions
in which they work. Id. The Court also recognized, however, that the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general. Id. Thus, the Court held that it is necessary to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the employee, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. See id While the
courts will not apply the Pickering balancing test at the motion to dismiss stage of
the proceedings because the application of that test requires a weighing of facts, a
potential volunteer plaintiff should be prepared to battle governmental defendants on
these grounds. See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-287
(1977) (suggesting whether government would have terminated plaintiff in the
absence of protected conduct is a question of fact for the jury to decide); see also
Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 810 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The inquiry into whether
Plaintiffs interests in speaking outweigh the [Defendants'] interests in regulating
Plaintiffs speech is a factual determination conducted under the well known
Pickering balancing test.").
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that volunteers are protected from retaliation based on the exercise of
their First Amendment rights.
